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It is well known for the common multi-population evolutionary dynamics applied to nor-
mal form games that a pure strategy combination is asymptotically stable if and only if
it is a strict equilibrium point. We extend this result to sets and show the following. For
certain regular selection dynamics every connected and closed asymptotically stable set
of rest points containing a pure strategy combination is a strict equilibrium set and hence
a Nash equilibrium component. A converse statement holds for two person games, for
convex strict equilibrium sets and for the standard replicator dynamic.
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For the typical evolutionary dynamic of an asymmetric game a pure strategy combination
is asymptotically stable if and only if it is a strict Nash equilibrium.
This observation has been made repeatedly (see, for instance, Eshel and Akin (1983),
Ritzberger and Vogelsberger (1989), Samuelson and Zhang (1992) and Ritzberger and
Weibull (1995)). The term ‘typical’ in the above statement refers to generalizations of
the (standard) replicator dynamics for asymmetric normal form games. The restriction
to pure strategy combinations is important. It is well-known that the Nash equilibrium
in Matching Pennies (which is mixed) may or may not be asymptotically stable under
very similar dynamics (see, e.g. Maynard Smith (1982), Appendix J, or Weibull (1995),
p. 199ﬀ).
Many games, in particular extensive-form games, have components of Nash equilibria
that do not consist of isolated equilibria. If a strategy combination is contained in such
a component then it will not be asymptotically stable as Nash equilibria are rest points.
We will hence study the asymptotic stability of entire sets of strategy combinations. To
keep the focus on Nash equilibria, we limit attention to sets of rest points.
We are interested in results that hold under any evolutionary dynamics that shares
some basic properties with the replicator dynamics. While some theoretical results single
out the replicator dynamics as a central learning and imitation dynamics (e.g. Borgers
and Sarin (1997), Gale, Binmore, and Samuelson (1995), Schlag (1998)), the replicator
dynamics is a knife-edge case in the sense that very similar dynamics perform very dif-
ferently. By focussing on basic properties we can hence focus on results that depend on
these properties and not on speciﬁc functional forms.
Still, a necessary ﬁrst step is to understand selection under the replicator dynamics.
For this special case we obtain a very clear-cut characterization. We ﬁnd that asymp-
1totically stable sets of rest points are precisely the strict equilibrium sets of the game.
A strict equilibrium set (short, SE set) is a set-valued generalization of the concept of a
strict equilibrium. Recall that a Nash equilibrium is called strict if every player strictly
loses by unilaterally deviating from the equilibrium. Following Balkenborg (1994) a set
of Nash equilibria is called a strict equilibrium set (SE set) if for any element in the set,
a player either loses strictly by unilaterally deviating or if his deviation leads to another
equilibrium in the set. Thus the set of Nash equilibria as a whole is robust against de-
viations in the same sense as it is the case for a strict equilibrium. The proof of the
asymptotic stability of SE sets relies on an alternative characterization of SE sets that is
motivated by Thomas (1985) notion of an evolutionarily stable set.
Returning to more general evolutionary dynamics we work with the following frame-
work. The dynamics considered apply to asymmetric normal form games resulting from
asymmetric evolutionary conﬂicts between as many populations as there are players in the
game.1 The individuals in each population are assumed to play pure strategies. The dy-
namics governing the change in play are in continuous time. We require that the dynamics
have the following qualitative features. They are regular selection dynamics as deﬁned in
Samuelson and Zhang (1992). This ensures that faces of the strategy simplex are invari-
ant. Intuitively, such dynamics model processes where only mutation, not selection itself,
can cause new strategies to be played. They have been extensively studied in the litera-
ture. However, many processes which assume more rationality of the agents like the best
response dynamics (see Hofbauer (1995b)), ﬁctitious play or perturbed versions of these
dynamics (see, e.g., Fudenberg and Levine (1998) and Hopkins (1999)) are ruled out. In
addition we require that the dynamics reinforces best replies which is deﬁned through the
1In contrast, the classic concept of an ESS applies to settings where a symmetric game is played within
a single population.
2following four properties applied to each population separately. A) The growth rate of
any best reply is non-negative. B) Unless all strategies currently played in the population
are already best replies these growth rates are strictly positive. C) Non-best replies have
a negative growth rate when all strategies currently played are best replies. D) Some
strategy currently played has a positive growth rate if not all strategies currently played
achieve the same payoﬀ. The class of dynamics reinforcing best replies includes all sign
preserving (Nachbar (1990)) and monotone dynamics (Samuelson and Zhang (1992)), in
particular the standard and the adjusted replicator dynamics, all sophisticated imitation
dynamics in Hofbauer and Schlag (2000) and many of the imitation dynamics considered
in Hofbauer (1995a) and Weibull (1995).
Warned by the Matching Pennies example we need to restrict the kinds of sets we
consider in order to achieve our goal of obtaining a single selection result for any dynamics
that reinforces best replies. Singleton sets consisting of a pure strategy combination and
SE sets should remain as candidates. We decide to focus on sets that contain at least one
pure strategy combination in each of its components, a property that any SE set has. We
show that any asymptotically stable set of rest points with this property is a SE set. In
this respect dynamics that reinforce best replies do not diﬀer from the replicator dynamics
where the additional property is satisﬁed automatically.
While conversely any SE set is asymptotically stable under the replicator dynamics
we cannot show this for any dynamics reinforcing best replies. We show this only when
the SE set has the additional property that each element of the SE set is a best response
to its best responses. This additional condition is automatically satisﬁed in two-player
g a m e so rw h e nt h eS Es e ti sc o n v e xb u ti tn e e dn o th o l di ng e n e r a lf o rS Es e t s .
Combining the above ﬁndings, we obtain for two player games a tight characterization
of asymptotic stability in purely static, game theoretic terms. Namely a non-empty set
3of strategy combinations is an asymptotically stable sets of rest points for all regular
selection dynamics reinforcing best replies if and only if the set is an SE set.
In a related study, Ritzberger and Weibull (1995) show for a slightly diﬀerent class of
evolutionary dynamics that a face is asymptotically stable if and only if it is closed under
better replies. (There is no condition on how the dynamics behaves within the set.) Our
ﬁndings complement their results. To be closed under better replies means hereby that
after replacing the strategy of one or several players by a pure better reply to the current
strategy combination the resulting strategy combination also belongs to the face. While
they consider only faces we focus on sets containing a pure strategy combination in each
component. They allow for cycling and other behavior within the set while we consider
only sets of rest points. For this reason SE sets do not always exist, in contrast to faces
that are closed under better replies. A SE set can be strictly contained in a face that is
closed under better replies but not vice versa. SE sets are subsets closed under better
replies only when they are convex in which case they equal an entire face. In fact, a face
consisting of Nash equilibria is a SE set if and only if it is closed under better replies.2
This paper adds to the literature on set-wise solution concepts for evolutionary games.
As shown in more detail in Balkenborg (1994) SE sets are the multi-population counterpart
of evolutionarily stable sets deﬁned for single population contests in Thomas (1985) (see
also Balkenborg and Schlag (2001)). However, the use of explicit dynamics diﬀerentiates
this paper from other investigations into the evolutionary stability of sets (e.g. Sobel
(1993) or Swinkels (1992)) that remain in a static framework.
Our characterization result for the replicator dynamics also connects to recent research
on strategic stability. Applying Corollary 1 in DeMichelis and Ritzberger (2000), we
obtain that a connected SE set contains a strategically stable set if its Euler characteristic
2This follows immediately from Proposition 1 iii) and Lemma 2.
4is non-zero.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. SE sets are deﬁn e di nS e c t i o n2a n d
their basic properties are studied. In Section 3 the connection between SE sets and the
replicator dynamics is made using the concept of a direct evolutionarily stable set. Section
4 introduces the properties deﬁning a dynamics that reinforces best replies. Sections 4
and 5 investigate the relationship between asymptotically stable sets of rest points and
SE sets. Section 6 contains the conclusion.
2 Strict Equilibrium Sets
Before we introduce strict equilibrium sets we must ﬁrst recall some basic game-theoretic
terminology and indicate the notations we use. We closely follow Ritzberger and Weibull
(1995).
For a (ﬁnite) normal form game Γ the ﬁnite set of players is denoted by N =
{1,2,...,n}.T h e ﬁnite set consisting of the Ki pure strategies sk
i, k =1 ,2,...,K i,
of player i ∈ N is denoted by Si. S = ×i∈NSi is the set of pure strategy combinations
with generic element s =( s1,s2,...,s n). The set of mixed strategies of player i is the
(Ki − 1)-dimensional unit simplex ∆i =
n
σi ∈ R
Ki
+ |
PKi
k=1 σk
i =1
o
. Pure strategies sk
i
are identiﬁed with the corresponding unit vectors ek
i ∈ ∆i. ∆ = ×i∈N∆i is the set of
mixed strategy combinations with generic element σ =( σ1,σ2,...,σn). We will often
ignore the order when describing an n-tupel provided it is clear from the indexation. For
instance, we will write (σ−i,τi) for the strategy combination played when player i uses
strategy τi while all other players use their respective strategies in the strategy combina-
tion σ.
The support of a mixed strategy σi ∈ ∆i is denoted by supp(σi)=
©
sk
i ∈ Si |σk
i > 0
ª
.
5The support of a mixed strategy combination σ ∈ ∆ is the Cartesian product supp(σ): =
×i∈N supp(σi). Every subset Ti ⊆ Si of a player’s pure strategy set spans a face F(Ti): =
{σi ∈ ∆i | supp(σi) ⊆ Ti} of his mixed strategy simplex ∆i. The faces of the convex
polyhedron ∆ are the sets F(T)=×i∈NF(Ti) spanned by a Cartesian product of pure
strategy sets T = ×i∈NTi, Ti ⊆ Si for i ∈ N. Every mixed strategy σi ∈ ∆i generates a
face F(σi)=F(supp(σi)) ⊆ ∆i and every mixed strategy combination σ ∈ ∆ generates
af a c eF(σ)=F(supp(σ)) ⊆ ∆.
The mapping u : S → Rn deﬁnes for pure strategy combinations the payoﬀ to each
player. The multilinear expected payoﬀ function U : ∆ → Rn and the mixed best reply
correspondence ˜ β = ×i∈N˜ βi : ∆ → ∆ are deﬁned in the usual manner. σ ∈ ∆ is a Nash
equilibrium when σ ∈ ˜ β (σ), it is a strict Nash equilibrium when {σ} = ˜ β (σ). The pure
best reply correspondence β = ×i∈Nβi : ∆ → S is deﬁned by β (σ)=˜ β (σ)∩S.W er e c a l l
that ρ ∈ ˜ β (σ)i ﬀ supp(ρ) ⊆ β (σ). As done here we often write “iﬀ” for “if and only if”.
Deﬁnition 1 An o n - e m p t ys u b s e tG ⊆ ∆ is a strict equilibrium set (SE set) if for
all σ ∈ G and all τi ∈ ∆i the inequality
Ui (σ−i,τi) ≤ Ui (σ)
holds whereby equality implies (σ−i,τi) ∈ G.
In fact, if G is an SE set and σ, τi are as above then Ui (σ−i,τi)=Ui (σ) if and only
if (σ−i,τi) ∈ G. Notice that a SE Set consists of Nash equilibria. Moreover, a singleton
set {σ} is a SE set if and only if σ is a strict Nash equilibrium. Every set of strict Nash
equilibria is a SE set, but not every strict equilibrium set is a set of strict Nash equilibria.
It is immediate from the deﬁnition that every union and every non-empty intersection
of SE sets is a SE set.
6Lemma 1 A strict equilibrium set contains a strategy combination iﬀ it contains its sup-
port.
Proof. Fix a strategy combination σ ∈ ∆.F i xi ∈ {1,..,n} and (r1,···,r i−1,r i) ∈
×1≤j≤i supp(σj). Let ρ =( r1,···,r i−1,r i,σi+1,···,σn).
Suppose
¡
ρ−i,σi
¢
belongs to the SE set. Since
¡
ρ−i,σi
¢
is a Nash equilibrium we have
Ui
¡
ρ−i,s i
¢
= Ui
¡
ρ−i,σi
¢
for all si ∈ supp(σi). The deﬁnition of a SE set implies that all
strategy combinations
¡
ρ−i,s i
¢
, si ∈ supp(σi)b e l o n gt ot h eS Es e t .
Suppose, conversely, that all strategy combinations
¡
ρ−i,s i
¢
with si ∈ supp(σi)b e l o n g
to the SE set. Since ri ∈ supp(σi)w eh a v eUi
¡
ρ−i,s i
¢
= Ui
¡
ρ−i,r i
¢
for all si ∈ supp(σi).
(We obtain “≥”a n d“ ≤” because the strategy combinations appearing on both sides
of the equation belong to the SE set). Therefore Ui
¡
ρ−i,σi
¢
= Ui
¡
ρ−i,r i
¢
and hence
¡
ρ−i,σi
¢
belongs to the SE set.
For the statements deﬁned for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n
(Si)“ T h es e t( ×1≤j≤i supp(σj)) × (×i+1≤j≤n {σj}) is contained in the SE set.”
we have hence shown that statement (Si)i se q u i v a l e n tt os t a t e m e n t( S ( i − 1)). It follows
by induction from i =0t oi = n and vice versa that statement (S0) is equivalent to (Sn).
Since statement (S0) means that σ belongs to the SE set and statement (Sn)t h a tt h e
support of σ is contained in the SE set the lemma is proven.
Proposition 1 i) Every SE set contains a pure strategy combination.
ii) Every SE set is a ﬁnite union of faces and hence closed.
iii) A SE set is convex iﬀ it is a face. Moreover, if a face F is a SE set then ˜ β (σ)=F
for all σ ∈ F.
iv) Every SE set is a ﬁnite union of connected SE sets.
v) A SE set is connected iﬀ it is a minimal SE set in the sense that it does not properly
contain another SE set.
7Proof. (i) and (ii) are obvious given Lemma 1.
Let G be a SE set and hence by (ii) a ﬁnite union of faces of ∆. Assume G is convex.
Then there exists a maximal face F(σ)c o n t a i n e di nG, i.e. a face contained in G that is not
ap r o p e rs u b s e to fa n o t h e rf a c ec o n t a i n e di nG. Assume that τ ∈ G. Because G is convex
it contains 1
2σ+ 1
2τ. The lemma implies then that G contains the face F
¡
1
2σ + 1
2τ
¢
.S i n c e
F(σ) is a maximal face contained in G we must have F(σ)=F
¡
1
2σ + 1
2τ
¢
and therefore
τ ∈ F(σ). It follows that G is a subset of F(σ) and hence that F(σ)=G.
Now suppose that the face F = ×i∈N Fi is a SE set. Let σ ∈ F and i ∈ N.T h e
deﬁnition of a SE set implies for every τi ∈ ˜ βi (σ)t h a tτi ∈ Fi and hence ˜ β (σ) ⊆ F.
Conversely, if τi ∈ Fi then both σ and (σ−i,τi) are Nash equilibria as elements of F and
therefore τi ∈ ˜ βi (σ) holds. This proves F ⊆ ˜ β (σ) and hence (iii).
As a ﬁnite union of faces a SE set G is a ﬁnite union of connected components, i.e. of
maximally connected subsets of G. Consider such a connected component G0 of G.L e t
σ ∈ G0 and let τi be a strategy of player i ∈ N.T h e n ui (σ−i,τi) ≤ ui (σ). Suppose
ui (σ−i,τi)=ui (σ). Setting τα
i =( 1− α)σi +ατi we ﬁnd that ui (σ−i,τα
i )=ui (σ)h o l d s
for all 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Hence {(σ−i,τα
i )}0≤α≤1 is contained in G. Together with the fact that
G0 is a connected component and that σ ∈ G0 we obtain that {(σ−i,τα
i )}0≤α≤1 is contained
in G0. In particular (σ−i,τi) belongs to G0 which proves that G0 is a SE set. Hence (iv)
holds.
Given (iv) a minimal SE set must be connected. To prove the converse, assume that
aS Es e tG0 is properly contained in a connected SE set G.S i n c eG is a connected union
of faces it must contain a face F = ×i∈NF(Ti)( Ti ⊆ Si)t h a ti n t e r s e c t sG0, but is not
contained in G0.S i n c e G0 is also a union of faces, there exists a face F0 = ×i∈NF(T0
i)
that is maximal with respect to the property of being contained in the boundary of F and
being contained in G0.F o rs o m ep l a y e ri ∈ N there is a pure strategy ri ∈ Ti\T0
i. Hence
8there must exist a pure strategy combination s ∈ ×i∈NF(T0
i) ∈ G0 with (s−i,r i) / ∈ G0 since
otherwise a face larger than F0 in the boundary of F would be contained in G0.W eh a v e
ui (s)=ui (s−i,r i)s i n c eb o t hs and (s−i,r i)a r ec o n t a i n e di nG. However, since s ∈ G0
and (s−i,r i) / ∈ G0 this contradicts the assumption that G0 is a SE set. This concludes the
proof of (v).
For an arbitrary subset, not necessarily a Cartesian product, T ⊆ S of pure strategy
combinations we deﬁne the n-convex hull of T as3
G (T): ={σ ∈ ∆ | supp(σ) ⊆ T}.
G (T)i st h e( ﬁnite) union of all faces F(σ)w i t hs u p p( σ) ⊆ T. In this terminology Lemma
1 states that a SE set is the n-convex hull of the pure strategy combinations it contains.
We show now that in order to verify that a set of type G (T)i saS Es e ti ts u ﬃces to verify
the SE set conditions for pure strategy combinations only.
Lemma 2 Suppose T ⊆ S is a non-empty subset of pure strategy combinations such that
for all s ∈ T and all ti ∈ Si the inequality
ui (s−i,t i) ≤ ui (s)( 1 )
holds whereby equality implies (s−i,t i) ∈ T. Then the n-convex hull G (T) of T is a SE
set.
Proof. Suppose τi ∈ ∆i and σ ∈ G (T), i.e. supp(σ) ⊆ T. The multilinearity of the
expected payoﬀ function then implies Ui (σ−i,τi) ≤ Ui (σ) because (1) applies to every
3This terminology is appropriate. Generalizing t h en o t i o no fab i c o n v e xs e ti nA u m a n na n dH a r t
(1986) we call a subset R ⊆ ∆ n-convex if it contains with any σ,( σ−i,ρi) ∈ R the strategy combinations
(σ−i,(1 − α)σi + αρi) for all 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. It is not diﬃcult to show that the set G (T)d e ﬁn e di nt h et e x t
is the smallest n-convex set containing T.
9s ∈ supp(σ)a n dti ∈ supp(τi). Ui (σi,τi)=Ui (σ) implies equality in (1) and thereby
(s−i,t i) ∈ T for all s ∈ supp(σ)a n dti ∈ supp(τi), which implies (σ−i,τi) ∈ G (T).
Remark 1 For a given set of players N and their pure strategy sets Si every set G (T)
(∅ 6= T ⊆ S) occurs as a SE set for suitably chosen payoﬀ functions. For instance, deﬁne
a game with identical interests (i.e. a game with ui (s)=uj (s) for all s ∈ S, i,j ∈ N)b y
ui (s)=

 
 
1f o rs ∈ T
0f o rs/ ∈ T
.
Lemma 2 implies immediately that G (T)i saS Es e to ft h i sg a m e .
Remark 2 As unions of faces SE sets are fairly simple objects. Still, their topological
properties can be interesting. To illustrate this, suppose that all N players have the same
number K of strategies, so Si =
©
s1
1,···,s K
i
ª
. Consider the game with identical interest
deﬁned as in the previous remark when T is the set of pure strategy combinations where
not all players choose the strategy with the same index k,i . e .
T = S\
©¡
s
k
1,···,s
k
N
¢
|1 ≤ k ≤ K
ª
When there are three players each with two strategies the SE set G (T) is a cycle. The
space of mixed strategy combinations Σ can then be visualized as a cube, as in Figure 1.
The eight pure strategy combinations correspond to the eight vertices of the cube. The
cycle G (T) indicated by the fat lines consists of six edges of the cube connecting the six
vertices other than (s1
1,s 1
2,s 1
3)a n d( s2
1,s 2
2,s 2
3). Similarly, the SE set G (T)i sat o p o l o g i c a l
cycle when there are two players with three strategies each. For general N and K G (T)
can be shown to be a topological sphere.
Remark 3 Not every ﬁnite union of faces can occur as a SE set. Consider, for instance,
the boundary G of the space of mixed strategy combinations ∆. It is the union of all
10(s1
1, s2
1, s3
1)
(s1
2, s2
2, s3
2)
Figure 1: A SE set can be a cycle.
proper faces of ∆. G cannot be a SE set because it is not the n-convex hull of the pure
strategy combinations it contains. (G contains the set of all pure strategy combinations
S,b u tG 6= G (S)=∆.)
Remark 4 The set of strategy combinations that maximize the sum of the player’s pay-
oﬀs in a game with identical interests (or the potential in a weighted potential game, see
Monderer and Shapley (1996)) is a SE set. In particular, SE sets exists for these types of
games. Of course SE sets often do not exist as, for instance, in Matching Pennies.
3 Evolutionary stability and the replicator dynamics
In order to understand the relevance of SE sets for the replicator dynamics it is necessary
to demonstrate the equivalence between the notion of SE sets and a set-valued concept
of evolutionary stability motivated by Thomas (1985). The results in this section were
ﬁrst proven in Balkenborg (1994), where the connection to Thomas’ original concept is
discussed in detail.
Deﬁnition 2 A direct evolutionarily stable set (direct ES set) is a closed, non-
empty set G of strategy combinations where every strategy combination σ in G has a
11neighborhood V (σ) such that
X
i∈N
Ui (ρ) ≤
X
i∈N
Ui
¡
ρ−i,σi
¢
(2)
holds for all ρ ∈ V (σ) whereby equality implies ρ ∈ G.
We borrow the term “direct” from Selten (1980) to emphasize the diﬀerence to Thomas’
notion of an evolutionarily stable set.
Proposition 2 A set of strategy combinations is a direct ES set iﬀ it is a SE set.
Proof. Let σ be a strategy combination in a direct ES set G. Let τi be any strategy
of player i,l e tε ∈ (0,1) and let ρ =( σ−i,(1 − ε)σi + ετi)w h e r eε is suﬃciently small
such that ρ ∈ V (σ). Then inequality (2) must hold for this particular ρ. However, since
ρ =
¡
ρ−j,σj
¢
for all j 6= i, this inequality simpliﬁes to
Ui (σ−i,(1 − ε)σi + ετi) ≤ Ui (σ)
or Ui (σ−i,τi) ≤ Ui (σ). (3)
i.e. σ is a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, equality in (3) implies (σ−i,(1 − ε)σi + ετi) ∈ G.4
In order to conclude that (σ−i,τi)i si t s e l fi nG we must use in addition that G is a closed
set. If we have equality in (3) we obtain ui (σ−i,τi)=ui (σ−i,ρα
i ) for all ρα
i =( 1− α)σi+
ατi,0≤ α ≤ 1. Let δ be the supremum of all α with (σ−i,ρα
i ) ∈ G. Closedness implies
¡
σ−i,ρδ
i
¢
∈ G and hence ui (σ−i,τi)=ui
¡
σ−i,ρδ
i
¢
implies
¡
σ−i,(1 −ˆ ε)ρδ
i +ˆ ετi
¢
∈ G for
small ˆ ε > 0. This contradicts the deﬁnition of δ unless δ = 1. Therefore (σ−i,τi) ∈ G.
Consequently, every direct ES set is a SE set.
In order to prove the converse it is not enough to consider strategy combinations ρ
that coincide with an element σ of the SE set except for the strategy of a single player.
For arbitrary ρ close to σ we use multilinearity to obtain a Taylor expansion of the
4This part of the argument mimics the proof in Selten (1980) that a direct ESS is a pure strategy.
12diﬀerence
P
i∈N
¡
ui (ρ) − ui
¡
ρ−i,σi
¢¢
around σ. We show that the lowest nonzero terms
in the expansion correspond to the payoﬀ losses of players who deviate unilaterally from
strategy combinations in the SE set. These are hence negative and it turns out that higher
order terms can be ignored if ρ is suﬃciently close to σ.
More speciﬁcally, ﬁx a strategy combination σ in the SE set G. It is well-known and
immediately veriﬁed that the sets
V˜ ε (σ)={ρ ∈ ∆ | for all i ∈ N: ρi =( 1− εi)σi + ετi with τi ∈ ∆i and 0 ≤ εi ≤ ˜ ε}
form for 0 < ˜ ε < 1 a basis of neighborhoods of σ in ∆ since ∆ is a convex polyhedron.5 We
need the following notation. For a subset of players I ⊆ N,l e tSI = ×i∈ISi, εI = ×i∈Iεi,
τ (sI)=×i∈Iτi (si).
¡
σN\I,τI
¢
denotes the strategy combination where the players in I
use their strategies in τ while the others use their strategies in σ.F o rρ =( 1− ε)σ+ετ ∈
V˜ ε (σ) we obtain the multilinear expansion
X
i∈N
¡
ui (ρ) − ui
¡
ρ−i,σi
¢¢
(4)
=
X
i∈N
εi
¡
ui
¡
ρ−i,τi
¢
− ui
¡
ρ−i,σi
¢¢
(5)
=
X
i∈N
X
J⊆N\{i}
εi (1 − ε)N\(J∪{i}) εJ
£
ui
¡
σN\(J∪{i}),τJ∪{i}
¢
− ui
¡
σN\J,τJ
¢¤
=
X
∅6=I⊆N
(1 − ε)N\I εI
"
X
i∈I
¡
ui
¡
σN\I,τI
¢
− ui
¡
σN\(I\{i}),τI\{i}
¢¢
#
(6)
=
X
∅6=I⊆N
X
sI∈SI
(1 − ε)N\I εIτ (sI)
"
X
i∈I
¡
ui
¡
σN\I,s I
¢
− ui
¡
σN\(I\{i}),s I\{i}
¢¢
#
(7)
For ∅ 6= I ⊆ N we call sI ∈ SI trivial if ui
¡
σN\I,s I
¢
= ui
¡
σN\(I\{i}),s I\{i}
¢
holds for
all i ∈ I.W ed e ﬁne recursively for any set of players ∅ 6= I ⊆ N the sets SI
0, SI
−, SI
+ ⊆ SI
as follows. sI ∈ SI belongs to SI
0 if sI is trivial and if either I = {i} for some i ∈ N or if
5For arbitrary closed convex sets a corresponding statement would not necessarily be true.
13sI\{i} ∈ S
I\{i}
0 for all i ∈ I. sI ∈ SI belongs to SI
− if sI is not trivial and if either I = {i}
for some i ∈ N or if sI\{i} ∈ S
I\{i}
0 for all i ∈ I.O t h e r w i s esI ∈ SI belongs to SI
+.
Since σ ∈ G it follows by induction for all I ⊆ N that
¡
σN\I,s I
¢
∈ G for all sI ∈ SI
0.
For sI ∈ SI
− we obtain hence ui
¡
σN\I,s I
¢
≤ ui
¡
σN\(I\{i}),s I\{i}
¢
for all i ∈ I whereby
a strict inequality must hold for at least one (and actually, all) i ∈ I because sI is not
trivial. Because there are only ﬁnitely many strategy combinations of this type we can
ﬁnd a strictly positive number A such that
X
i∈I
¡
ui
¡
σN\I,s I
¢
− ui
¡
σN\(I\{i}),s I\{i}
¢¢
< −A
holds for all ∅ 6= I ⊆ N, sI ∈ SI
−. Similarly, there exists a positive constant C such that
X
i∈I
¡
ui
¡
σN\I,s I
¢
− ui
¡
σN\(I\{i}),s I\{i}
¢¢
<C
holds for all ∅ 6= I ⊆ N, sI ∈ SI
+. Moreover, our construction implies for all ∅ 6= I ⊆ N
and sI ∈ SI
+ that there exists a proper, non-empty subset J of I such that sI =
¡
sJ,s I\J
¢
with sJ ∈ SJ
−. Hence we obtain the following upper bound for the expression in (7):
X
∅6=I⊆N
X
sI∈SI
−
εIτ (sI)
h
−A(1 −˜ ε)
n−#I +˜ εWC
i
where W is an appropriate positive constant. We can now choose ˜ ε > 0s os m a l lt h a t
the terms in square brackets (which do depend on the choice of σ but not on the choice
of τ) are strictly negative. It follows then that (4) is not positive for any τ.M o r e o v e r ,i f
there exists ∅ 6= I ⊆ N and sI ∈ SI
− such that εIτ (sI) > 0 then (4) is strictly negative.
Suppose hence that εIτ (sI)=0f o ra l l∅ 6= I ⊆ N and sI ∈ SI
−.W em u s tt h e na l s oh a v e
εIτ (sI) = 0 for all ∅ 6= I ⊆ N and sI ∈ SI
+ since each such sI takes the form
¡
sJ,s I\J
¢
with sJ ∈ SJ
−. Thus all terms in the sum of (7) and of (6) are zero. It then follows by
induction that all strategy combinations
¡
σN\I,τI
¢
, I ⊆ N, are in the SE set. By Lemma
1 G contains the support of all these strategy combinations and hence also the support
of ρ.A g a i nb yL e m m a1 ,ρ belongs to the SE set. Thus G is a direct ES set.
14We can now begin our investigation of evolutionary dynamics. We need the following
terminology and notation. Again, we follow closely Ritzberger and Weibull (1995).
A regular selection dynamics on ∆ is a system of ordinary diﬀerential equations
˙ σ
k
i = σ
k
if
k
i (σ), ∀k =1 ,...,K i, ∀i ∈ N
with continuous functions fk
i : ∆ → R for i ∈ N describing the growth rates of pure
strategies sk
i such that all fk
i (σ)σk
i are Lipschitz continuous and such that
P
k fk
i (σ)σk
i =
0h o l d sf o ra l lσ ∈ ∆, i ∈ N. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, the term “dynamics” will
always refer to a regular selection dynamics. For every σ0 ∈ ∆ the system of diﬀerential
equations has a unique solution {σt}t≥0 ⊂ ∆ starting in σ0. This trajectory satisﬁes
supp(σt)=s u p p ( σ0) for all t ≥ 0. In particular, faces of ∆ are invariant under the
dynamics.
An important example of a regular selection dynamics is the (standard) replicator
dynamics (Taylor (1979)) ˙ σk
i = σk
i
£
Ui
¡
σ−i,s k
i
¢
− Ui (σ)
¤
. Borgers and Sarin (1997) show
how the replicator dynamics arises from a model of learning and Schlag (1998) shows how
it is derived from an “optimal” imitation rule.
The following concepts refer to a given dynamics. σ ∈ ∆ is a rest point if ˙ σk
i =0f o r
all i ∈ N and 1 ≤ k ≤ Ki.As e tG ⊆ ∆ is forward invariant if all trajectories starting
i nt h i ss e tr e m a i ni nt h i ss e t .Aneighborhood of a set G ⊆ ∆ is a set containing an open
set which contains G. G is (Lyapunov) stable if every neighborhood U of G contains
a neighborhood V of G such that any trajectory starting in V never leaves U. ρ is an
ω-limit point of a trajectory {σt}t≥0 if every neighborhood of ρ contains points σt of the
trajectory with arbitrarily large t.T h e ω-limit set of a trajectory is the set of all its
ω-limit points. A closed non-empty set G is an attractor if it has a neighborhood U such
that the ω-limit sets of trajectories starting in U are contained in G. A stable attractor
is called asymptotically stable. A single strategy combination σ ∈ ∆ is (asymptotically)
15stable if the singleton set {σ} is (asymptotically) stable. In this paper we are primarily
interested in asymptotically stable sets of rest points. Such sets are clearly isolated sets
of rest points. A set of rest points is isolated i fi tc o n t a i n e di na no p e ns e tt h a tc o n t a i n s
no other rest points. Asymptotically stable sets or rest points are clearly isolated.
The relevance of direct ES sets for the replicator dynamics becomes apparent if we use
Lyapunov functions similar to those considered in Zeeman (1980). Namely, for a mixed
strategy combination σ and mixed strategies combinations ρ ∈ ∆ with supp(σ) ⊆ supp(ρ)
deﬁne the function
L
σ (ρ)=
X
i∈N
X
sk
i ∈supp(σi)
σ
k
i ln
¡
ρ
k
i
¢
.
It is a well-known straight forward exercise to show that Lσ is strictly concave with a
unique maximum at σ. Hence the sets Vδ (σ)={ρ ∈ | Lσ (ρ) ≥ Lσ (σ) − δ} (δ > 0) form
a basis of neighborhoods of σ.L e t( ρt)t≥0 be the trajectory under the replicator dynamics
where supp(σ) ⊆ supp(ρ0). Then
˙ L
σ ¡
ρ
t¢
=
dLσ (ρt)
dt
=
X
i∈N
X
sk
i ∈supp(σi)
∂Lσ
∂ρk
i
d(ρt)
k
i
dt
=
X
i∈N
X
sk
i ∈supp(σi)
σk
i
(ρt)
k
i
h¡
ρ
t¢k
i
¡
Ui
¡
ρ
t
−i,s i
¢
− Ui
¡
ρ
t¢¢i
=
X
i∈N
¡
Ui
¡
ρ
t
−i,σi
¢
− Ui
¡
ρ
t¢¢
.
This calculation shows that a closed, non-empty set G of strategy combinations is by
deﬁnition a direct ES set if and only if for each strategy combination σ ∈ G and all
suﬃciently small δ > 0 the neighborhoods Vδ (σ) are forward invariant under the replicator
dynamics and contain only rest points in G.
A direct ES set G consists hence of stable rest points and, being compact, is itself
stable. The following argument taken from Thomas (1985), proof of Theorem 2, shows
that any trajectory (ρt)t≥0 starting in a suﬃciently small neighborhood Vδ (σ)o fσ ∈ G
16converges to a rest point ˆ ρ in G.L e t ˆ ρ ∈ Vδ (σ)b eaω-limit point of the trajectory.
Then Lσ increases along the trajectory, hence ˙ Lσ (ˆ ρ)=0( L e m m a2 . 6 . 1i nH o f b a u e ra n d
Sigmund (1998)) and so ˆ ρ ∈ G by the deﬁnition of a direct ES set. Thus the trajectory
enters all suﬃciently small neighborhoods Vδ (ˆ ρ) and never leaves them, i.e. it converges
to ˆ ρ. Using again the compactness of G, it follows that G is an attractor. To summarize,
we have shown:
Lemma 3 Under the replicator dynamics a direct ES set is asymptotically stable and
consists of stable rest points.
For the replicator dynamics our major aim is to establish the following result.
Theorem 1 An o n - e m p t ys e to fs t r a t e g i e si saS Es e ti ﬀ it is an asymptotically stable set
of rest points under the replicator dynamics. Moreover, for this dynamics every element
of a SE set is Lyapunov stable.
Proposition 2 and Lemma 3 above imply the “only if” and the “moreover” statement
of this result. The proof of the “if” statement requires a diﬀerent line of arguments which
we develop in the next section.
SE sets consist of Nash equilibria and the latter are always rest points of the replicator
dynamics. Since asymptotically stable sets of rest points are isolated Proposition 2 and
Lemma 3 also imply the following result.
Corollary 1 AS Es e ti saﬁnite union of Nash equilibrium components.
As an application of Corollary 1 in DeMichelis and Ritzberger (2000) we obtain, in
their terminology, from Lemma 3 (iv) and Proposition 1 the following connection between
SE sets and the reﬁnement concept of strategic stability.
Corollary 2 A SE set with non-zero Euler characteristic contains an M-stable set.
174 When are asymptotically stable sets SE sets?
In the following we consider more general regular selection dynamics that satisfy the
following intuitive properties.
Deﬁnition 3 A regular selection dynamics reinforces best replies if the following
conditions hold for any player i ∈ N,a n ys t r a t e g yc o m b i n a t i o nσ ∈ ∆ and any pure
strategy sk
i ∈ Sk
i .
A) The inequality fk
i (σ) ≥ 0 holds whenever sk
i ∈ βi (σ).
B) The inequality fk
i (σ) > 0 holds whenever sk
i ∈ βi (σ) and σi / ∈ ˜ βi (σ).
C) The inequality fk
i (σ) < 0 holds whenever sk
i / ∈ βi (σ) and σi ∈ ˜ βi (σ).
D) If for some sk
i ∈ supp(σ), i ∈ N, Ui
¡
σ−i,s k
i
¢
6= Ui (σ) then σ is not a rest point.
Property (A) states that best replies are not selected against. Since
P
sk
i ∈supp(σi) σk
ifk
i (σ)=
0h o l d sf o ra l lσ ∈ ∆ and i ∈ N it implies that all Nash equilibria are rest points. Prop-
erty (B) means literally that best replies are reinforced (i.e. have positive growth rates)
whenever possible.6 When applied to a best reply sk
i that is currently not played, i.e.
sk
i / ∈ supp(σi), it has implications for what would happen if a small mutation would lead
to the introduction of this strategy. We need it primarily for the following lemma.7
Lemma 4 a) A pure strategy combination belonging to a stable set of rest points for a
regular selection dynamics satisfying Property (B) is a Nash equilibrium.
b) A stable set of rest points for a diﬀerentiable regular selection dynamics satisfying
Property (B) consists of Nash equilibria.
6Notice that Property B) does not imply Property A). Consider the 2 × 2 game where all payoﬀsa r e
identically zero. The replicator dynamics for matching pennies vacuously satisﬁes Property B) for this
game, but it does not satisfy Property A).
7We conjecture that part b) of the lemma does not hold without diﬀerentiability.
18Proof. Suppose σ belongs to a stable set of rest points, but is not a Nash equilibrium.
Since σ is not a Nash equilibrium there exists by Property (B) a pure best reply sk
i with
fk
i (σ) > 0. Since σk
ifk
i (σ) = 0 holds at a rest point, sk
i is not in the support of σi.
a) If σ = s is a pure strategy combination then the strategy combinations σα =
¡
s−i,(1 − α)si + αsk
i
¢
(0 ≤ α ≤ 1) form a one-dimensional face of ∆ which is invari-
ant under the dynamics. By continuity, fk
i (σα) > 0h o l d sf o ra l ls u ﬃciently small
α. Consequently, there is a 0 < β < 1w i t hfk
i
¡
σβ¢
> 0 such that any trajectory
starting in σα with α > 0s u ﬃciently small will reach σβ in ﬁnite time. The set
V =
©
ρ ∈ ∆ | ρk
ifk
i (ρ) < 1
2βfk
i
¡
σβ¢ª
is a neighborhood of the set of all rest points that
does not contain σβ. Since trajectories starting arbitrarily close to s leave this neighbor-
hood, s cannot belong to a stable set of rest points.
b) We can assume without loss of generality that s
Kj
j ∈ supp(σj)f o ra l lj ∈ N.T h e
linearization of the vectorﬁeld around σ is then described by a matrix
A =
Ã
∂ρk
ifk
i
∂ρl
j |ρ=σ
!
i∈N,k∈{1,..,Ki−1}
j∈N,l∈{1,..,Kj−1}
.
The product rule yields
∂ρk
ifk
i
∂ρl
j |ρ=σ
=

  
  
³
ρk
i
∂fk
i
∂ρl
j
´
|ρ=σ
=0 f o rj 6= i or l 6= k
³
fk
i (ρ)+ρk
i
∂fk
i
∂ρk
i
´
|ρ=σ
= fk
i (σ)f o rj = i and l = k
The matrix A has hence a row where the diagonal element is fk
i (σ) > 0a n dw h e r ea l l
other entries are zero. This implies that the linearization of the vectorﬁeld around σ has
a positive Eigenvalue. It is well known that σ cannot be a stable rest point under this
condition (see e.g. Hirsch and Smale (1974)).
The proof given by Hirsch and Smale (1974) in fact shows more. In Hirsch and Smale
(1974) the state space is transformed so that the rest point under consideration is the
origin x = 0. Then a compact neighborhood U of the rest point and a closed cone C are
19constructed with the following three properties. i) There are no rest points other than
x =0i nC ∩ U. ii) Trajectories starting in C ∩ U remain in C as long as they remain
in U.i i i ) T r a j e c t o r i e s w h i c h s t a r t i n C ∩ U but not at the rest point x =0l e a v et h e
neighborhood U in ﬁnite time. Notice that (i) follows from part (a) of the lemma on page
188 and that (iii) emerges from the discussion following the lemma on pages 189 — 190.
Now let D be the boundary of U intersected with C. D is a closed set containing
no rest points. Its complement N is an open neighborhood of the set of all rest points.
By construction there are trajectories starting arbitrarily close to the rest point x =0i n
C ∩ U which enter D and hence leave N.T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t x = 0 cannot belong to a
stable set of rest points.
Thus Property (B) serves to make rest points that are not Nash equilibria unstable.
Property (C) symmetrically serves the purpose of stabilizing Nash equilibria in the sense
of not allowing trajectories to move in the direction of non-best responses. It will be used
in the next section.
Properties (A) and (B) do not impose any restrictions on the dynamics in points
where no player is choosing a pure best response, for instance when all players use only
strictly dominated strategies. Property (D) requires that some selection is still at work
in such situations. It states that the selection process does not come to a halt as long as
not all pure strategies currently used are equally good. The assumption has one crucial
implication. It implies that all rest points of the dynamics considered must also be rest
points for the replicator dynamics. Moreover, we can describe the potential rest points σ in
purely game-theoretic terms as “partial equilibria” in the sense that the Nash equilibrium
condition Ui (σ) ≥ Ui
¡
σ−i,s k
i
¢
(eﬀectively “=”) is satisﬁed with respect to all strategies
sk
i in the support of σi, i ∈ N.
20Since a SE set is an isolated set of rest points for the replicator dynamics by Lemma
3 we obtain:
Lemma 5 A SE set is an isolated set of rest points for any regular selection dynamics
satisfying Properties (A) and (D).
Classes of regular selection dynamics frequently discussed in the literature and to which
our results apply are the sign preserving (Nachbar (1990)) and the monotone (Samuelson
and Zhang (1992)) dynamics.
Ad y n a m i c si smonotone if sign
¡
fk
i (σ) − fl
i (σ)
¢
=s i g n
¡
Ui
¡
σ−i,s k
i
¢
− Ui
¡
σ−i,s l
i
¢¢
holds for all σ ∈ ∆, i ∈ N, sk
i,s l
i ∈ Si. Nachbar calls a dynamics sign preserving if
signfk
i (σ)=s i g n
¡
Ui
¡
σ−i,s k
i
¢
− Ui (σ)
¢
holds for all σ ∈ ∆, i ∈ N, sk
i ∈ Si.( W e i b u l l
(1995) speaks of a “payoﬀ positive dynamics”.) It is immediate to verify that a sign
preserving dynamics in the sense of Nachbar and a monotone dynamics reinforces best
replies.8 Notice, however, that Ritzberger and Weibull (1995) already call a dynamics
sign preserving if fk
i (σ) < 0 holds whenever Ui
¡
σ−i,s k
i
¢
<U i (σ) holds and vice versa.
This weaker notion does not imply our Property (B).
The replicator dynamics is both monotone and sign preserving.
Recall that an asymptotically stable set of rest points is isolated.
Proposition 3 Suppose the regular selection dynamics under consideration satisﬁes Prop-
erties (A) and (B) and is either diﬀerentiable or satisﬁes Property (D). Then an isolated
and stable set of rest points of the dynamics for which every connected component contains
ap u r es t r a t e g yc o m b i n a t i o ni saS Es e t .
8A detailed proof for monotone dynamics is given in Balkenborg and Schlag (2003).
21Note that the statement is not correct without the restriction to sets that contain a
p u r es t r a t e g yc o m b i n a t i o ni ne a c hc o n n e c t ed component. Matching Pennies is a coun-
terexample. Its unique equilibrium is interior and is hence not contained in a SE. How-
ever, it is asymptotically stable under the “normalized” replicator dynamics (see May-
nard Smith (1982), Appendix J, or Weibull (1995), p. 199ﬀ) or various imitation dynamics
(see Hofbauer and Schlag (2000)).
Proof. Let T be the non-empty set of all pure strategy combinations in a set of rest
points R with the required properties. We will ﬁrst apply Lemma 2 to show that G (T)i s
a SE set. By Lemma 4 (a) T consists of Nash equilibria. Hence it remains to be shown
for all s ∈ T and sk
i ∈ Si that ui
¡
s−i,s k
i
¢
= ui (s) implies
¡
s−i,s k
i
¢
∈ T.I ft h i se q u a l i t y
holds then both si and sk
i are best replies to s. Property (A) implies that all strategy
combinations σα (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) deﬁned as in the proof of Lemma 4 (a) are rest points. Since
R is an isolated set of rest points it must contain all σα and in particular the strategy
combination σ1 =
¡
s−i,s k
i
¢
, which was to be proven.
Thus G (T) is a SE set, consists of Nash equilibria and hence of rest points. Since
every connected component of G (T) intersects the isolated set of rest points R, G (T)i s
contained in R.
I ft h ed y n a m i c si sd i ﬀerentiable we know from Lemma 4 (b) that R consists of Nash
equilibria. Because G (T)i saﬁnite union of Nash equilibrium components (by Corollary 1)
we can ﬁnd a neighborhood of G (T) that contains no Nash equilibria outside G (T). Hence
every connected component of R that intersects G (T)i sc o n t a i n e di nG (T). Therefore R
is contained in G (T) and we conclude G (T)=R.
If the dynamics satisﬁes Property (D) we can instead argue as follows. By Lemma 5
G (T) is an isolated set of rest points. Since every connected component of R intersects
G (T) by assumption it must hence be contained in G (T). Again we obtain R ⊆ G (T)
22and hence R = G (T).
We can now prove the “if” statement in Theorem 1.
Proof. Given Proposition 3 all we have to show is that every connected component
of an asymptotically stable set of rest points under the replicator dynamics contains a
pure strategy combination. We ﬁrst show that each of the connected components is itself
asymptotically stable. The rest points of the replicator dynamics are precisely the “partial
equilibria” described earlier. These form a closed semi-algebraic set and are therefore a
ﬁnite union of closed, connected components. Given the deﬁnition of asymptotic stability
it follows that each component is asymptotically stable.
Next we show that any given connected asymptotically stable set R contains a pure
strategy combination. Consider a strategy combination σ contained in this set with
minimal support. Let F be the face spanned by the support of this strategy combination.
The intersection R∩F is asymptotically stable for the replicator dynamics restricted to F,
which is the replicator dynamics of the game restricted to this face. By minimality, σ is a
pure strategy combination or R∩F is contained in the relative interior of F. Proposition
6 in Ritzberger and Weibull (1995) states that the latter cannot be true and hence σ is a
pure strategy combination.
5 When are SE sets asymptotically stable?
For dynamics other than the replicator dynamics we can prove a converse statement to
Proposition 3 only under an additional restriction which is always satisﬁed in two-player
games even if the SE set is a cycle as in Remark 2 in Section 2 when N =2a n dK =3 .
It is not always satisﬁed in games with more than three players as an example below will
show. It still holds for the cycle in Remark 2 in Section 2 when N =3a n dK =2a n d
23for every convex SE set.
Lemma 6 Suppose G is a SE set in a two-player game or a convex SE set. Then G
satisﬁes the property:
Every strategy combination σ in G has a neighborhood V (σ) such that
σ ∈ G and ρ ∈ V (σ) ∩ ˜ β (σ) implies σ ∈ ˜ β (ρ). (*)
Proof. Choose V (σ)=∆.C o n s i d e r σ ∈ G and ρ ∈ ˜ β (σ). Assume that there are
only two players. Then (σ−i,ρi) ∈ G for i =1 ,2 and hence σ ∈ ˜ β (ρ). Alternatively,
assume that G is convex. Then σ ∈ ˜ β (ρ) by Proposition 1 (iii). In both cases Property
(*) holds for V (σ)=∆.
Proposition 4 Every SE set satisfying Property (*) is an asymptotically stable set of
stable rest points for any regular selection dynamics satisfying Properties (A), (B) and
(C).
Notice that if G is an asymptotically stable set of stable rest points then all trajectories
starting suﬃciently close to G converge to an element G. Thus Property (*) causes
trajectories starting near to a SE set to converge to elements of the set.
Although the proof of Proposition 4 is complicated by the fact that we do not impose
diﬀerentiability the intuition behind it is simple. Because of Property (C) all non-best
replies die out suﬃciently fast. Consequently, the local behavior of the dynamics near an
element σ in the SE set is characterized by its behavior on the face ˜ β (σ).9 For trajectories
starting in a neighborhood of σ in ˜ β (σ), Properties (A) and (*) imply that the frequency
9W h e nt h ed y n a m i c si sd i ﬀerentiable ˜ β (σ) can be shown to be a center manifold. If it is twice
diﬀerentiable this part of the argument follows then directly from the reduction principle for center
manifolds, see Anosov and (Eds.) (1988) Part I, §4.3.
24of every pure strategy in the support of σ cannot decrease over time. This causes σ to
be stable. Property (B) can then be used to ensure that trajectories converge to Nash
equilibria near σ which by Corollary 1 must be in the SE set.
Proof. Fix a strategy combination σ in the SE set G. σ is a rest point as σ is a Nash
equilibrium. Let F(σ)=×i∈NF(σi) ⊆ G be the face generated by σ.
We deﬁne for ρ ∈ ∆
γ (ρ): =
X
i∈N
X
sk
i / ∈βi(σ)
ρ
k
i and ˙ γ (ρ): =
X
i∈N
X
sk
i / ∈βi(σ)
ρ
k
if
k
i (ρ).
With these deﬁnitions
dγ(ρt)
dt = ˙ γ (ρt) holds along every trajectory {ρt}. Since the dynam-
ics satisﬁes Property (C) we have fk
i (σ) < 0 for all sk
i / ∈ βi (σ). Because each fk
i (σ)i s
continuous there exists a constant c>0s u c ht h a tfk
i (ρ) < −c holds for all i ∈ N and all
sk
i / ∈ βi (σ)i nas u ﬃciently small neighborhood of σ.T h e r e f o r e
˙ γ (ρ) ≤− cγ (ρ) ≤ 0( 8 )
holds in such a neighborhood.
Since the dynamics is Lipschitz continuous we can ﬁnd a constant L>0 such that
the inequality
X
i∈N
X
sl
i∈Si
¯ ¯ρ
l
if
l
i (ρ) − ˆ ρ
l
if
l
i (ˆ ρ)
¯ ¯ ≤ L
X
i∈N
X
sl
i∈Si
¯ ¯ρ
l
i − ˆ ρ
l
i
¯ ¯ (9)
holds for all ρ,ˆ ρ ∈ ∆ suﬃciently close to σ.
We now show that the sets
Vδ (σ)=

 
 
ρ ∈ ∆
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
γ (ρ) < δ and
ρk
i > σk
i + 2L
c γ (ρ) − 2L
c δ for all i ∈ N, sk
i ∈ supp(σi)

 
 
indexed by δ > 0 form a basis of neighborhoods of σ.N o t i c e t h a t e a c h Vδ (σ)i sa n
open set containing σ and hence a neighborhood of σ. The claim then follows once we
show that every neighborhood Uε (σ)=
©
ρ ∈ ∆|
¯ ¯ρk
i − σk
i
¯ ¯ < ε
ª
with ε > 0c o n t a i n sa
25neighborhood Vδ (σ). Given ρ ∈ Vδ (σ)w eh a v ef o re a c hi ∈ N that ρk
i −σk
i > −2L
c δ holds
for all sk
i ∈ supp(σi)a n da l s of o ra l lsk
i / ∈ supp(σi)s i n c et h e nσk
i =0 . T h i si m p l i e sf o r
all sk
i ∈ Si
ρ
k
i − σ
k
i =
X
l6=k
¡
σ
l
i − ρ
l
i
¢
< (Ki − 1)
2L
c
δ.
Therefore Vδ (σ) ⊆ Uε (σ)w h e n e v e rδ ≤ c
2L(K−1)ε where K =m a x i∈N Ki.
Next we establish a useful inequality. Represent each ρi ∈ ∆i as ρi =( 1− λi)τi+λiνi
where λi ∈ [0,1], τi ∈ ˜ βi (σ)a n ds u p p( vi) ∩ βi (σ)=∅. For this representation
X
i∈N
X
sl
i∈Si
¯ ¯ρ
l
i − τ
l
i
¯ ¯ =2
X
i∈N
λi =2 γ (ρ). (10)
Fix i and k such that sk
i ∈ supp(σi). Assumption (*) implies for τ =( τi)i∈N ∈ ˜ β (σ)t h a t
each sk
i is a best reply to τ. Hence fk
i (τ) ≥ 0 holds since the dynamics satisﬁes Property
(A). (9) and (10) yield
−ρ
k
if
k
i (ρ) ≤− ρ
k
if
k
i (ρ)+τ
k
if
k
i (τ) ≤ L
X
j∈N
X
sl
j∈Sj
¯ ¯ρ
l
j − τ
l
j
¯ ¯ =2 Lγ (ρ).
Together with (8) we obtain
ρ
k
if
k
i (ρ) ≥
2L
c
˙ γ (ρ)
for all ρ suﬃciently close to σ.
Now we are ready to show that Vδ (σ) is forward invariant for suﬃciently small δ > 0
which means that σ is Lyapunov stable. Let δ > 0b es u ﬃciently small such that (8) and
(9) hold for all ρ ∈ Vδ (σ). Let {ρ(t)}t≥0 be a trajectory with ρ(0) ∈ Vδ (σ). Let T>0
be the ﬁrst time where the trajectory leaves Vδ (σ). We must have γ (ρ(T)) < δ since
˙ γ (ρ) ≤ 0h o l d sf o ra l lρ ∈ Vδ (σ). Moreover, for all sk
i ∈ supp(σi), i ∈ N,
ρ
k
i (T) − ρ
k
i (0) =
Z T
0
ρ
k
i (t)f
k
i (ρ(t))dt ≥
2L
c
Z T
0
˙ γ (ρ(t))dt =
2L
c
(γ (ρ(T)) − γ (ρ(0)))
and hence
ρ
k
i (T) ≥ ρ
k
i (0) +
2L
c
γ (ρ(T)) −
2L
c
γ (ρ(0)) > σ
k
i +
2L
c
γ (ρ(T)) −
2L
c
δ
26so that ρ(T) ∈ Vδ (σ), a contradiction.
Finally, we have to show that G is asymptotically stable which follows once we show
for all suﬃciently small δ > 0 that the ω-limit set of any trajectory {ρ(t)}t≥0 starting
in Vδ (σ)i sc o n t a i n e di nG.L e tˆ ρ ∈ Vδ (σ)b ea nω-limit point of a trajectory {ρ(t)}t≥0
starting in Vδ/2. By Corollary 1 we can assume that the only Nash equilibria in Vδ (σ)
belong to G. We can also assume that supp(σ) ⊆ supp(ρ) for all ρ ∈ Vδ (σ). γ (ρ(t)) is
non-increasing along the trajectory and hence (see Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998) Theorem
2.6.1) ˙ γ (ˆ ρ) = 0. Because ˙ γ (ρ) < 0f o ra l lρ ∈ Vδ (σ)\˜ β (σ) we conclude ˆ ρ ∈ ˜ β (σ). By (*)
it follows that each sk
i ∈ supp(σ)i sab e s tr e p l yt oˆ ρ.I fˆ ρ were not a Nash equilibrium we
could ﬁnd by Property (B) of the dynamics a player i ∈ N such that fk
i (ˆ ρ) > 0 and hence
ˆ ρ
k
ifk
i (ˆ ρ) > 0 would hold for all sk
i ∈ supp(σ). Then ρk
i (t) would be strictly increasing
for suﬃciently large t. Theorem 2.6.1 in Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998) would yield the
contradiction ˆ ρ
k
ifk
i (ˆ ρ) = 0. Consequently ˆ ρ is a Nash equilibrium and therefore in G.
Central to our proof is our use of Property (*) to show that every strategy combination
in a SE set is stable. We derive asymptotic stability of the set as a consequence. We do not
know whether SE sets are still asymptotically stable under any dynamics that reinforces
better replies if (*) is not satisﬁed. However, the following example of a SE set in a
2×2×2-game shows that one can no longer expect stability of each strategy combination
in the set. The dynamics we construct satisﬁes all our conditions and is actually aggregate
monotonic in the sense of Samuelson and Zhang (1992).
In the game in Figure 2 player 1 chooses one of the rows U or D,p l a y e r2o n eo f
the columns L or R and player 3 one of the matrices F or B.L e t x1 =p r o b ( D),
x2 =p r o b( R)a n dx3 =p r o b( B). We describe mixed strategy combinations by vectors
(x1,x 2,x 3).
27F z }| {
LR
U 000010
D 101101
B z }| {
LR
U 101101
D 101101
x1
x2
x3
Figure 2: A game with an SE set not satisfying Property (*) where not all Nash
equilibria are stable.
The set G = {x1 =1 }∪{x3 =1 } is a SE set of the game. It is shaded in the graphic.
This SE set does not satisfy property (*) because any strategy combination (x1,x 2,x 3)=
(1 − ε,0,1 − ε)w i t h0< ε < 1i sab e s tr e p l yt o( D,L,B) ∈ G while (D,R,B)i st h e
unique best reply to (x1,x 2,x 3).
Consider the following dynamics:
˙ x1 = x1 (1 − x1)(1− x3)
2
˙ x2 = x2 (1 − x2)(1− x1)(1− x3)
˙ x3 = x3 (1 − x3)(1− x1)
2
It is obtained from the replicator equations by squaring the terms (1 − x3) and, respec-
tively, (1 − x1) in the equations for ˙ x1 and ˙ x3 so that the speed of a trajectory in the x1
28and x3 d i r e c t i o ni ss l o w e dd o w nw h i l et h es p e e di nt h ex2 direction is unaltered. It is not
diﬃcult to see that G is an asymptotically stable set of rest points. We claim that the
points (1,x 2,1) ∈ G with x2 < 1 are not stable.
By symmetry, the plane {x1 = x3} is invariant. Consider any trajectory x(t) starting
in the relative interior of this plane. Then limt→∞ x1 (t) = limt→∞ x3 (t)=1 . Separation
of variables shows that
x2 (t)=
cx1 (t)
1 − x1 (t)+cx1 (t)
holds for an appropriate constant c>0. Therefore, limt→∞ x2 (t)=1 . Thus we can ﬁnd
trajectories starting arbitrarily close to any (1,x 2,1) which converge to (1,1,1).
Bringing together Propositions 3, 4 and Lemma 6 we obtain the following characteri-
zation results for dynamics other than the replicator dynamics:
Theorem 2 Consider a regular selection dynamics reinforcing best replies and a non-
empty set G for which every connected component contains a pure strategy combination.
a) If the game is a two-player game then G is an asymptotically stable set of stable
rest points iﬀ G is a strict equilibrium set.
b) If G is convex then G is an asymptotically stable set of rest points iﬀ G is a strict
equilibrium set.
Moreover, we obtain for two-player games orc o n v e xs e t st h a te l e m e n t so fa s y m p t o t i -
cally stable sets of rest points are stable. This means that trajectories starting suﬃciently
close to the set converge to a point in the set. Starting nearby to the set a learning pro-
cess will not only lead to convergence to the set (which does not exclude the possibility
of endless cycling) but to convergence towards a single form of behavior.
296C o n c l u s i o n
Conditions for meeting the requirements of a SE set are easily veriﬁed in speciﬁce x a m p l e s
which makes the results of this paper very applicable. For illustration we point out two
evolutionary investigations where the existence of SE sets is now easily veriﬁed. The set
of Nash equilibria inducing the forward induction outcome for the twice repeated battle-
of-the-sexes game (between two players) selected in van Damme (1989) is a SE set and
thus asymptotically stable under any dynamics that reinforces best replies. The set of
eﬃcient equilibria in the action commitment game between two players studied by van
Damme and Hurkens (1996) is also a SE set. In this latter case the notion of a SE set
reﬁnes their solution concept which also included ineﬃcient outcomes. Further examples
of SE sets in repeated games are contained in Balkenborg (1995), for cheap talk games
see Schlag (1994).
Unfortunately SE sets often do not exist. In such cases, following Proposition 3,
there will be no asymptotically stable set of rest points that contains a pure strategy
in each component. In order to investigate whether other asymptotically stable sets of
rest points exist, following Theorem 1, more information about the speciﬁcd y n a m i c si s
needed. Moreover, it may be necessary to impose weaker dynamic conditions on the sets
predicted, e.g. to abandon the restriction to rest points as in Ritzberger and Weibull
(1995), or to consider asymptotic stability only with respect to interior trajectories as in
Binmore and Samuelson (1994), Cressman (1996) and Cressman and Schlag (1997).
We conjecture that SE sets are asymptotically stable even if Property (*) is not sat-
isﬁed and hence the SE set does not have to consist of stable rest points. However, our
method of proof cannot be used to show this because it used the stability of the rest points
to show the asymptotic stability of the entire set. Additional interesting topics for future
research include investigating necessary conditions for asymptotic stability combined with
30point stability and analyzing how dynamics behave close to a SE set when payoﬀsa r e
perturbed.
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